

Our Duty towards Our Master: Hegel's Feelings on Feelings

Goran Vranešević

Even though there have been countless rigorous and valuable depictions of the effort put into understanding the struggle between the figures of power and subordination, most prominently envisioned by Hegel as the figures of master and slave, lord and bondsman, or master and servant, there is still some room to improvise and put forth a less glamorous illustration of this logic. This illustration should, in the last instance, meaningfully contribute to our understanding of the contemporary image of the master. In *casu nostro*, we will take a closer look at the immanent role feelings play in this relationship, where they are expressed as a duty to the other. The topic of feelings is not usually considered a vital part of Hegel's thought, but that makes it all the more important to take notice when it comes to the fore.

But let us begin with a less obvious reference to the dialectic between the master and servant. The case in point is the renowned encounter between Jesus and Mary Magdalene that nearly culminates in a touch, which was notably preceded by Mary's awe-struck sight of her Rabboni, which is to say, Master (John 20, p. 16). But the impetus for Jesus's return, for his sudden appearance behind Mary's back, could not have occurred without Mary's mourning, without her tears. Jesus was thus summoned by her affects, her weeping up the dead and recognizing him as

the teacher, the master, and the lord.¹ But for a slight moment, she misrecognized him as the gardener, a servant of the burial ground. Due to the change in his characteristics, he becomes unrecognizable, as his voice and image do not align. This aspect is a less essential but nonetheless a revealing detail. Crucially, Mary's affective servitude to the Lord or Jesus is particularly symptomatic regarding the structure of master and servant logic. Any given master arises from such an emotional misrecognition, appearing firstly as a thing like any other. It is only through the mediation of a servant, not only through his labor (*Arbeit*) for the master, but also through his tears and joys that the master acquires his own pleasure. This relocation of feelings from the bearer, who is not built to carry their burden, to the intermediary, who is in this relationship by force of circumstances, whose weight he alone can bear, will be the focus of the article. In doing so, we will also reflect on the role of feelings themselves, which are too often treated as an appendage to more serious matters of reason.

From Consciousness to the Master and to His Other

Now, let us continue by turning our attention to an example all too familiar to us. Perhaps the principal image that is bound up with Hegel, with his dialectical twists and his political turns: self-consciousness's encounter on the battlefield of *mutual recognition*, which culminates in the introduction of the figures of master and servant. This example, as is well known, is introduced in his

¹ There are other instances of weeping and crying for Jesus. For instance, in Luke's Gospel a sinful woman comes to Jesus and starts crying at his feet. She then begins to wash his feet with her tears, and dries them with her hair, kissing them many times (7:36-50). Although Jesus, when Mary Magdalene tried to touch him, asked her not to cling to him (*mē mou háptou*), to keep her distance from him, he used the touch of the sinful woman as a universal expression of the forgiveness of sins. Jesus forgives her many sins because of her love and affection.

Phenomenology of Spirit, as a form of unfolding of consciousness, from sense-certainty to reason. Although it is one of the most famous episodes in the history of philosophy, the specificity of the implications of our reading makes it worth briefly summarizing.

The passages in question illustrate consciousness's winding path to itself through various stages that begin with life in its pure state, a state that does *not* contain within itself any desire (*Begierde*), a state where consciousness is presented only with sensuous-certainty (*sinnliche Gewissheit*). This mode of being further unfolds into the notion of the conscious I, which sees in otherness the negative moments of its essence and so commits itself to its sublation as the only way of gaining true certainty. Hegel characterizes this striving as the desire that was missing in the immediate state of certainty. This struggle of consciousness with others and itself concludes in actual self-consciousness. At the initial point of actualization, consciousness is bereft of the sensual matter that first held it in its own solitude and solipsism as consciousness immerses itself in the interplay with other consciousnesses.

The individual self-consciousnesses are now staring into each other face-to-face "in the way ordinary objects do" (Hegel 2018, p. 110). Since nothing has yet happened between them, they are simply immersed in the being of life, in self-feeling (*Selbstgefühl*),² a self that is merely felt or feels itself in desire. Until they bring about the abstraction of an immediate being and thereby stand on their own feet as self-consciousness, their independence is non-existent. The truth of their actions here consists in presenting themselves as objects, as this is their only way of expressing certainty in themselves. The only thing that upholds the tension of this face-off is the sensuous certainty of both self-consciousnesses.

² Self-feeling ranges from pre-reflective sensations (*Empfindungen*) through sovereign feelings of oneself (feelings at one's disposal) to habitual modes of self-understanding (Dahlstrom 2013, p. 141).

Therefore, there is a need for further development in the construction of self-consciousness in the form of “absolute abstraction” (Hegel 2018, p. 111), which manifests itself as the pure negation of that thingliness of the other in which the two self-consciousnesses are trapped. By removing everything extraneous, all the determinations that are not a reflection of their doing, they can only affirm that they are not bound to any particular existence since they act as pure beings-for-themselves. The tension reaches its peak here as the double needs to be removed and sublated.³ In one fell swoop, the battlefield for life and death with the other self-consciousness opens up, for certainty must be affirmed *through* the other and *in* the other. This is why the most accurate depiction of this confrontation can be found in cases such as the low-budget horror cult film *The Evil Dead II* (Raimi et al. 1987), where the protagonist faces off with his possessed malevolent self in a slapstick fight, rather than Sergio Leone’s classic *Once upon a Time in the West*, which pits the hero against the antagonist and is accompanied by Ennio Morricone’s perfectly intertwined soundtrack.

The renunciation of this double risk, of risking one’s own head and the head of another, in whom one’s being is presented as an externality, does not lead to perdition since it is in this way that one becomes an ordinary person. Rather, the choice to engage in a life-and-death struggle seems pernicious, since certainty of one’s existence is in the last instance assured only in dying. It

³ The work of self-consciousness is always present in a twofold form. So from the very first form, self-consciousness is already caught up in double work: “It must sublimate its otherness. This is the sublation of that first two-sided ambiguity and is for that reason itself a second two-sided ambiguity. First, it must set out to sublimate the other self-sufficient essence in order as a result to become certain of itself as the essence through having sublated the other. Second, it thereby sets out to sublimate itself, for this other is itself” (Hegel 2018, p. 109). Such overtime labor expressed as “the redoubling of the double magnifies an active negativity—a repeated stutter or glitch—in the stillness of pure emptiness” (Aumiller 2018, p. 270). It is how self-consciousness savors its certainty.

appears that the only way for self-consciousness as such to prevail is for both self-consciousnesses striving for their recognition to eliminate one another. Thus, in the end, the winner is left with less than nothing, because through the “abstract negation,” what is left is only a dead unity or an immersion in the thingliness of consciousness.

If everyone involved were content with this scenario, then the path of self-consciousness would end here, in complete annihilation. Naturally, this is not the case. Feeling the fear of its own impending death shakes self-consciousness to its core since “life is as essential to it as self-consciousness” (Hegel 2018, p. 112), and this is not without consequences. The first self-consciousness yields, as it realizes its attachment to life by being unable to endure this absolute negation. This experience radically transforms the relationship between the two. They are no longer on equal footing as one self-consciousness is now confronted by a consciousness that appears in the form of a thingliness that succumbed to the necessity of life. In this game of existential Russian roulette, the other consciousness shrugs its shoulders in the face of this resignation to life and seems to take the initiative. By gaining autonomy, this self-consciousness now assumes the role of *master*, while the non-autonomous consciousness, which is subordinate to life, is content to serve the role of *servant*.

In more abstruse terms, a master is a master in that he refers to the “object of desire” (Hegel 2018, p. 113), to the object with which he is confronted (and able to negate) and to the consciousness for which the thingliness or the independence of being is what is essential. This independent being, over which the master has sovereignty and power (*Macht*), is held firmly by the servant, for his life depends on it. The servant, because of his servant-being, is not able to negate things, to eliminate them, but he is able to process, to rework, to manipulate them. And the master’s primacy or mastery in this relationship rests precisely on this substitution in the form of the servant’s work, who assumes management of

the annoying external things for him, so that he can provide a way of bringing about their pure negation. In doing so, namely, relegating the work, the master does away with them, and in the same stroke satisfies himself in pleasure (*Genüsse*), since he is able to only concern himself with being-for-itself. The servant is thus indirectly, through a chain of non-essential activity (*Tun*), subjugated to the master, but it is *only* through this mediation (via the servant) that the master refers to the thing as such. Moreover, the servant not only does laborious tasks for the master, he must also anticipate the master's wishes and desires in his work and behavior.

In Altman's *Gosford Park* (Altman et al. 2001), a whodunit murder mystery film, the housekeeper, Helen Mirren as Mrs. Wilson, in disclosing the circumstances of the murder, explains a more important detail, namely, the essential role that the servant occupies in the relationship to the master: "What gift do you think a good servant has that separates them from the others? It's the gift of anticipation. And I'm a good servant; I'm better than good, I'm the best; I'm the perfect servant. I know when they'll be hungry, and the food is ready. I know when they'll be tired, and the bed is turned down. I know it before they know it themselves." Normally we would recognize in this the absolute subservience of the servant, who lives only for the master's whims. But the idea behind his submission is more precise: the perfection shown by the servant is in fact a reflection of the fact that this is the master's doing.

The master turns out to be consistent with his initial wager, as he radically abolishes the thingliness, all privileged modes of being, and settles down into a passivity whose equilibrium is supported by the servant's labor. In hindsight, however, the other side of this relationship comes to the fore, as the master, in his eagerness to enjoy his *idleness*, made a miscalculation and unbeknownst to him threw away his independence. He thereby appeared as the opposite of what he wanted to be. Meanwhile, the servant in executing his work acquires the opposite of what

he immediately is—true independence. The master now functions as a doll converted from his hollow body, which the servant unknowingly conducts. A well-known depiction of the servants' role can be found in Tarantino's *Django Unchained* (Tarantino 2012), where the “house slave” Stephen is the one who articulates the outrage at the sight of the freed former slave Django riding on a horse instead of the master of the estate. The slave's bond to his master is so strong that, even upon his master's death at the end of the film, Stephen runs to his body and cries frantically. Here it is best to refer to Malcolm X, who emphatically points out this contradictory behavior:

When the house started burning down, that type of Negro would fight harder to put the master's house out than the master himself would. [...] When you come up through the gate when he's sitting on the master's porch, then he'll bare his fangs and get ready to bite you. Not because you're threatening him, but because you threaten his master who has trained him not to protect himself but to protect the *property* of the master. (1990, pp. 29-36)

What is essential in this tragicomic scenario is that the experience of a life-and-death struggle, an encounter with pure negativity, leaves its mark on the servant. It is not only a fear for this or that limb, or this or that particular moment, but as briefly already mentioned a fear for the servant's whole being, a feeling of “fear of death, this absolute master” (Hegel 2018, p. 115). The sight of death, the experience of pure nothingness manifests in itself a *sensual experience*, in which Hegel subjectivizes the essence of the substance. An absolute negativity which permeates the experience of self-consciousness - this universal detachment from natural existence, which, let us stress once again, the servant achieves exclusively through work - entails all the intricacies of dialectical logic. And it is only through this movement of the negative that restlessness or unrest (Unruhe), an affective inflection that characterizes self-consciousness, itself becomes apparent.

Affects of Desire and Affects of Fear

In light of such a negative experience, Alexander Kojève was right when he declared that “to speak of the ‘origin’ of Self-Consciousness is necessarily to speak of a fight *to* the death for recognition” (my emphasis, Kojève 1969, p. 7). According to Kojève’s influential reading on the hard-fought path of self-consciousness coming to itself, the inevitable struggle to death is a struggle for pure prestige that functions in terms of *desire* directed towards another *desire*, that is to say, desire for recognition.⁴ In this respect, it is essential to take into consideration that desire forms “structures of felt capacity that promote the exercise of power via various forms of agency” (de Courville Nicol 2011, p. 3). This should not be understood as a mere manifestation of inclination or drive, but as a moment of practical human will or the universal structure of self-determination.⁵

⁴ Just as a side note: the core principles of the mutual recognition logic in Hegel can be found back in his Jena period. There Hegel explicitly identified the struggle for recognition with the Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes* of individuals in the precontractual state. To abandon that relationship is precisely to produce the reality of right in general (*Erzeugen des Rechtes überhaupt*), i.e. to enter into a relationship of mutual recognition (*aner kennende Beziehung*) (Dahlstrom 2013, p. 145). There is also a second aspect of Hegel’s Jena discussion on the struggle for recognition that breaks with the Hobbesian account on the question of the motivation for this state of mutual alienation. In Hegel’s account, an individual finds herself in this state because of an underlying desire to be honored rather than merely to be preserved or empowered. And there is one final reading of this struggle that can be extracted from Hegel’s Jena period: he posits love and family as preceding and thereby informing the struggle for recognition. Being recognized in the family’s love constitutes a precondition for the formation of an independent consciousness.

⁵ It is important to point out that there is a difference between self-determination, viewed by Hegel in his phenomenological framework, and the self-determination of logic. The former is, as already mentioned, self-determination as the self-determination of self-consciousness, whereas the latter pertains to the concept of the concept.

This can be expressed as either desire or fear that dictates the way one is able to determine oneself. Scilicet, it is the practical capacity of self-realization to determine self-consciousness, which can be made based on the feeling of pleasantness (*Angenehmheit*) that comes to the fore when the demand for determination and the randomness of determination overlap. Or, conversely, unpleasantness (*Unangenehmheit*), which is the failure of this encounter as an external determination (*Fremdbestimmung*), turns out to be a necessary moment of self-determination. An example of this can be found in James Joyce's short story *Eveline*. The narrative revolves around the fate of the titular character, who is reflecting on whether to leave her broken home, which is ultimately sealed by her fear. Despite the hopelessness that lies ahead, she is incapable of taking a leap of faith: "She set her white face to him, passive, like a helpless animal. Her eyes gave him no sign of love or farewell or recognition" (Joyce 2004, p. 259). In retrospect, the twofold encounter of the servant with the master—the particular one in the individual struggle for recognition and the absolute one, before which his whole being trembles—becomes the means of endowing the servant with a working (class) consciousness in which *desire* will evaporate and be replaced by servitude. As already mentioned, things turn out differently for both the master and the servant.

In Kojève's hands, the master is non-dialectically executed, a faith so unceremonious that the master's twilight is mentioned almost in passing in a footnote: "the Master is simply killed, and he dies as Master" (1969, p. 225). The servant's nature, on the other hand, acquires exclusive rights over dialectical labors, but his prospects seem as hopeless as the master's. The servant quickly casts off his pure capacity to work and merges it together with the capacity to conceptualize his own death and thereby overcome it. The same pitfall that made the master fall from grace, namely the ambiguous sublation of otherness, now stands as the driving force of self-emancipation, emancipation from finitude and absolute

mastery. Now, if Kojève was aiming to highlight the right impasse registered in the overlapping of death and desire, he missed that the fear of death is not a random solitary affect, as it is woven together with anxiety and resentment. This affective immediacy namely forms the foundation of the uneven relationship between the master and the servant. It does not merely reflect a personal predisposition of a subjugated subject, but expresses a structural predicament that impacts agency as such, especially since affective expression concerns reason.

Let us briefly recap Hegel's own presentation of the deadlock between the master and servant and their inflictions. The exchange between master and servant is reciprocal, the master enjoying the products of labor, the servant feeling the effort of this labor. The master, by mediation, also receives all the by-products of this relationship, including feelings (*Gefühle*)⁶, which is crucial for our exposition of his character. We usually think of feelings as immediately given, as something that springs up in us spontaneously. For Hegel, who follows Kant, the course of events that brings forth their existence is, of course, not so simple. Since sensual consciousness is also the result of mediation with a sensual impression, which means that it is the opposite of itself, feelings cannot be directly given but are rather given as a negation of immediacy.

Thus, the feeling of fear caused by impending death, which drives the servant to the edge of the metaphysical precipice, does not touch the master. And this makes the servant all the more susceptible to anxiety, as his own being is shaken to the very core, but in this existential drama he is firmly supported by the work that is forced upon him. What is perhaps less obvious is that the

⁶ In a broader sense, Hegel uses feeling, emotion, and sensation interchangeably, especially in the *Encyclopaedia*, where it has a central place in the philosophy of the subjective theoretical spirit. However, there are specific differences between them that he highlights. For us, the most important detail is understanding feeling as the most concrete sense. On the relationship of senses, see Enc. (1) §369-370 and Enc. (2&3) §446-448.

result is emancipatory. As Hegel points out: “in his service he [the servant] sublates all of the singular moments of his attachment to natural existence” adding to this “through work, this servile consciousness comes round to itself” (Hegel 2018, p. 115). The master has based his consciousness on the object of desire, which, by its pure negation, maintains a certain “self-feeling.” This is an important detail, to which we will return later. In this way, satisfaction is expressed as a mere disappearance because it cannot settle on an object. For the servant, on the contrary, through work, desire expresses itself as a repressed desire, which tames the disappearance so that the negative relationship towards the object becomes the servant’s form of realization. In stepping out of itself, the work-servant consciousness ensures independence for the object through work and formation (*Bildung*), but by doing this, it importantly also gains independence for itself.

What we have before us is a self-conscious servant, to whom the object offers stability, even if he is held by the image of a master whose shadow weighs a ton and who seems to be the only one in the pair committed to feelings. However, it should be pointed out that the servant’s object of labor and formation is not only a sign of firm positivity because, according to Hegel, it contains within itself the very element of fear that drove the servant himself from the battlefield. That other being-for-itself, being-for-itself of the master before which he trembled in fear, thus “becomes in formative activity [as the form of formed things] an [servile] object to itself” (Hegel 2018, p. 117). He internalizes this fear and is now able to become aware of it through reflection. And here Hegel importantly adds, “without formation [which is here accompanied by labor], fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become for it itself” (Hegel 2018, p. 116). Only fear can sober up a servant’s head and he can become his own head and thereupon headstrong. Meanwhile, the master is not too bothered by the servants’ path of self-discovery, which, on the positive side, also allows for a certain distance to be maintained between them.

In order to fully justify the place of sensuality in the relationship between servant and master, it is helpful to read the section in *Phenomenology of Spirit* on the emergence of this dialectical duo together with his *Science of Logic*. Here we can find the following casual remark: “Pain is therefore the prerogative of living natures,” as it is through pain, Hegel emphasizes, that living natures discover that “they are in themselves the *negativity* of themselves” and that “this *their negativity* exists *for them*” (Hegel 2010b, p. 684). For the servant, fear for life is no longer enough to achieve self-consciousness, as there is a certain amount of pain required, pain that can only be embedded in labor and formation. Labor’s emancipating moment is thus the result of hard labor that induces constant affliction, anxiety, and distress. It is work that the Master does not invest, even though he exists only through work. The reason, of course, is that the master is not on the side of life, since he is only interested in the pleasure of eliminating independent being and in being recognized for it. The radical nature of this stance culminates in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, where the master as monarch is reduced to a bare signature. But his name remains essential.

This reading of the relationship between master and servant clearly shows that the key moments are all an immediate manifestation of emotional affectations (fear, desire, pleasure, etc.),⁷ whereby sensuality and perception are through the mediation of reflection transformed into their otherness, into the order of the reason. This is not a surprising reading, since it can be found, for example, in Hegel’s contemporary Karl Rosenkranz, according to whom, in Hegel’s hands, affects overlap with other activities of the mind, and thus the senses are already colored by thinking,

⁷ We are touching here on the traditional ancient themes of psychology, which include *inter alia* *Gefühl* (*pathos* and *affectus*), *Lust und Unlust* (*hedone* and *lupe*), *Neigung* (*orexis*, *inclanatio*), *Leidenschaft* (*pathos*, *passio*), *Glückseligkeit* (*eudaimonia*), *Willkür* (*prohairesis*), and *Wille* (*voluntas*).

and thinking is infused with feelings. This creates the appearance of a system that promotes the rationality of feeling, which is contrary to all philosophies that recognize in feeling the unity of inner life, the core of spiritual functioning, because they proceed from the premise that feeling is a function that is superior to the concept. It is not surprising, therefore, that a proper exposition of Hegel's subjective spirit, in which senses, feelings, and others are placed, is usually absent from discussions, since it has been obscured by the glamor of speculative logic. Part of the explanation for this degradation of feelings in the context of German classical philosophy can be found in the shadowy figure of the movement, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, who continually addressed conceptual challenges to the thinkers of that time from the position of sensuality.⁸

Feeling the Emptiness in Crying

Before drawing any final conclusions, we need a bit of context regarding Hegel's ambiguous nature of feelings. Affects namely have their own field of operation. As we have pointed out, the concept of life is itself a key element in Hegel's inquiry into the relationship between the two consciousnesses. However, the second aspect of life opens up an additional perspective as it concerns corporality and its emotional dimension. Hegel himself points out a few decades after publishing the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in the *Encyclopaedia*, how the Idea can only be actualized in itself in the body "in which it is [not] only Life, [but ...] existence as Spirit" (Hegel 2004, p. 24). Or, as he put it a few hundred pages later in

⁸ To take just one of his definitions of feeling, which circumvents reason: feeling is a sense of the supersensible, it is a sense that does not concern the visible world, but its content is reflected (through *Sinnes-Empfindung* or *Geistes-Gefühl*) in "knowing based in faith" (Jacobi 2004, p. 402).

the same work: “The body is the middle term by which I come together with the external world [...] so, if I want to actualize my aims, then I must make my physical body capable of carrying out this subjectivity into external objectivity” (Hegel 2007, p. 135). And even more specifically, in the section on Anthropology, the body becomes the sign of the soul, the externality in which it “feels itself” (ibid., p. 136), relating only to itself and setting the stage for “the higher awakening” (ibid., p. 140) of the soul to the I. This individualization of life, which is not only a function, reattaches Hegel’s philosophy to the contingencies of the world and in relationship with the latter establishes a space of agency and work. A similar conceptual shift can be traced back to Kant,⁹ who considered the body essential in the structuring of thoughts or in the constitution of consciousness, under the premise that thought cannot be separated from corporeality.

This in no way implies that it is necessary to renounce the metaphysical primacy of reason itself. On one hand, it only acknowledges bodily sensations as essential in constructing a reasonable reality and thereby reaffirms the exclusivity of the servant’s role in establishing the field of self-consciousness. On the other hand, the body’s banishment in favor of the plight of consciousness returns to affect the self with unforeseen ferocity. This occurs most prominently in the form of anxiety about the entire essence of consciousness when confronting the other or in its extreme form trembling the depths of the self while risking her life. In his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant stunningly almost repeats this climax of the struggle for recognition when he highlights the horror of death that the individual

⁹ Conveniently, the *Anthropology* itself provides us with a definition of melancholia that not only is clinical, but also oddly enough renders Kant’s own struggle with this “weakness” (2006, p. 97) ironic, even tragic: a “melancholic [hypochondriac]” man is well aware that the train of his thought does not move properly, but he has “insufficient control over himself to direct, restrain, or impel the course of his thought” (ibid., p. 96).

is faced with. The difference is that Kant is more precise as he equates the void of death with the void of sensation:

The void of sensations we perceive in ourselves arouses a horror (horror vacui) and, as it were, the presentiment of a slow death which is regarded as more painful than when fate suddenly cuts the thread of life. (Kant 2006, p. 12)

It therefore seems that feelings are inseparable from even the most speculative endeavors. However, such affects do not have to reflect metaphysical impasses, as they are also present in more mundane circumstances, for example, in crying, through which, according to Hegel, “pain is transformed, is excreted by the soul from its corporeality” (2007, p. 82).

A few years ago, a book was published whose title captures the spirit of what we are aiming at here. The book by László Földényi is titled *Dostoyevsky Reads Hegel in Siberia and Bursts into Tears*. Several biographies highlighted that Dostoyevsky managed to get his hands on a few books during his time in Siberia, but the only author who is mentioned by name is *Hegel*. The premise of the book rests on a speculation of sorts that the book in question was the Lectures on the philosophy of World History¹⁰ and that the tears were a reaction to Hegel's absolute devotion to reason. For instance, the aforementioned book mentions one of Hegel's passages: “Reason cannot stop to consider

¹⁰ See A. J. Vrangél, “Dosztojevskijjel Szibériában,” in *Istenkereső, polkójáró. Kortársak beszélnek Dosztojevskijről* (Budapest: Aurora, 1968), 137–156. In English, Vrangél's memoirs are partially included in Peter Sekirin, *The Dostoyevsky Archive: Firsthand Accounts of the Novelist from Contemporaries' Memoirs and Rare Periodicals, Most Translated into English for the First Time with a Detailed Lifetime Chronology and Annotated Bibliography*, (Jefferson, N.C., and London: McFarland, 270 Notes to Pages 21–41 1997). Hegel is mentioned in connection with Dostoyevsky and Vrangél's common studies in Joseph Frank, *Dostoevsky: The Years of Ordeal, 1850–1859* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 189.

the injuries sustained by single individuals,” and continues, “for particular ends are submerged in the universal end” (1975, p. 43). For Dostoyevsky, the radicalism of this principle rests on his own traumatic experience of the suffering, death, and defenselessness of man, which is presumably in stark contrast to Hegel, for whom, in Dostoyevsky’s eyes, we must look away from all affairs that are not of reason, from all that is not subject to the master, and from everything before which man is helpless. He himself stuck on the outside of the universal festivities of the history of reason, Dostoyevsky felt, hypothetically of course, the dread of nothingness. Overwhelmed, he could do nothing but weep *or*, the alternative presented by Földényi’s book, write and rebel, as embodied by his fictionalized memoir *The House of the Dead*.

However, Hegel may carry too heavy of a burden in this depiction. On the contrary, is it not Hegel, as we have already introduced through the relationship between master and servant, who takes the trouble to persevere all the forms of the spirit. The tensions and excesses that are manifested in the development of reason, in the demand for recognition and in the relation to things that are bound up therewith, are to a certain extent already imprinted in the very science of knowledge. Hegel opens up this science not by depriving the experience of sensuous certainty of its dignity, not brushing it aside, but rather taking it as seriously and necessarily as any other form of reason. There is a place for reflection on the structural place of the rabble and blunting (*Abstumpfung*) of the labor process. If Dostoyevsky wept, he did so for the right reason, namely the dread of nothingness, but with a misplaced emphasis.

Alternatively, we can offer a speculative reading of this curious incident. It refers to the explication of logic in the early passages of the *Encyclopaedia* where Hegel points to the scope of dialectics by highlighting how “even feeling, bodily as well as mental, has its dialectic” (Hegel 2010a, p. 131). To this he immediately adds that “everyone knows how the extremes of pain

and pleasure pass into each other: the heart overflowing with joy seeks relief in tears, and the deepest melancholy will at times betray its presence by a smile” (ibid.). In this context, it would have been more likely that there was a glimmer of hope that sparked Dostoevsky’s cry. It is namely well known that Russian readers and students saw in Hegel’s Lectures an intoxicating and even prophetic value.¹¹ Especially the idea that by reading history one could become acquainted with the plan of Providence¹² was very influential. But there is also a more agreeable reading if we refer to the emotional tensions present in the relationship between master and servant. Crying in Hegel’s philosophy is not just a random physical affect. In crying, one “externalizes [...] the inner tearing apart of the sensing person caused by a negative, – pain” (Hegel 2007, p. 82). For the servant, just fearing for one’s life is no longer enough to achieve self-consciousness, as there is a certain amount of pain required, pain that can only be embedded in labor and formation. So it was not unHegelian of Deleuze to have said somewhere that a philosophy that causes no tears, no one to cry, is worthless. These characteristics are of no concern to the master, who therefore has no reason to cry.

¹¹ See Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago, 1949) and *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought* (New York, 1964); Hans Küng, *The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel’s Theological Thought as Prolegomena to a Future Christology*, trans. J. R. Stephenson (Edinburgh, 1987); Timothy Bahti, *Allegories of History: Literary Historiography after Hegel* (Baltimore, 1992); G. B. Shaimukhambetova, *Gegel’ i vostok: Printsipy podkhoda* (Moscow, 1995); and Du-Yul Song, *Aufklärung und Emanzipation: Die Bedeutung der asiatischen Welt bei Hegel, Marx, und Max Weber* (Berlin, 1987).

¹² “Our cognition consists in gaining insight into the fact that what is purposed by eternal wisdom comes about not only in the realm of nature but also in the world of actual [human events] and deeds. In this respect our consideration is a theodicy, a justification of God” (Hegel 2011, p. 85).

Self-Feeling or Worse

To conclude, let us return to the function of the body. The body is there for a simple reason: for sensation not to crumble away and for life to persist. The servant, himself fearing death, is aware of that, meanwhile, the master's relationship to this precarious situation is less clear in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Fortunately, we can help ourselves again with Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*. The body is volatile and in need of a structuring principle. Control over the body can be realized only in the embodied individual as "self-feeling," a feeling of oneself, which is a result of specific processes in relation to nature that establish certainty for a particular individual. In the context of self-feeling, Hegel is explicating the soul in which "the subject as such posits [its determinations] within itself as its feelings" (Hegel 2007, p. 114). We already mentioned the detail that the master, as presented in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is holding himself together by negating the object and thus preserving self-feeling. It is essential insofar as it shows how the master in this procedure, in contrast to the servant, is immersed in a particularity of the sensation. The master follows the particular image of the subject and "at the same time [as he posits these determinations in itself] joins together with itself as subjective unit" (ibid.). As such, the master exists as self-feeling, and yet he is this "only in the particular feeling" (ibid.). Even though we saw that the master was caught up in the struggle for recognition, he is determined by this particularity of feeling. However, if the master is left fixated on this particular feeling, then we are giving the master over to madness. Then what else is madness than the fixation in a particular determination, or, as argued by Hegel, as a "thing [...] of finitude that is held within it" (ibid., p. 115).¹³ Now

¹³ "In this determination it is capable of falling into the contradiction between its subjectivity, free for itself, and a particularity which does not become ideal in subjectivity and remains fixed in self-feeling" (Hegel 2007, p. 115).

the master is no longer just stupid, as Žižek points out, but also crazy or mad. This insistence on a particular overdetermining feeling is perhaps the reason that the master never cries and never falters or questions himself. He is caught in his own *asocial* world of resentment and hubris that, nonetheless, as we have showed, needs another as the thing and another consciousness for which this thingliness is essential. While the master seems oblivious to the happenings of servants who can freely commune in their everyday life, the servants themselves are fundamentally tied to the expression of feelings as a sort of social bond. A bond between the servants that rests on the fear of death and the pain of work, but a bond nonetheless.¹⁴

It is precisely at this point that the figure of the contemporary capitalist master harbors a particular risk to the social bond as such. To shed away his clothes and start worrying about work and the feelings of others. Let us not forget that Hegel was largely inspired by Aristotle in conceptualizing the relationship between master and slave. Admittedly, the relationship is less subtle, having the master as the bearer of reason and the slave as the purveyor of affects,¹⁵ but in this manner the stakes are clearer. For example, the capitalist master readily makes use of or refers to the so-called emotional intelligence, which relies on empathy and social skills. The personification of this figure is Elon Musk, who may not have empathy for individual workers but all of whose endeavors are undertaken for the survival of humankind – a future-oriented empathy for humankind. And this hope has also been embraced

¹⁴ It is necessary to recognize that fear is intrinsically embedded in self-consciousness as this self is preserved through fear, since “fear is the feeling of my self,” but, and this is crucial, simultaneously a feeling “of an evil that threatens to destroy my self-feeling” (Hegel 2007, p. 210).

¹⁵ The slaves are subject to the senses and to desire and to the physical work that the master forces them to do. It is on the basis of this relationship that the human community is formed as an organic whole of the actualization of this reason.

by protesters in Iran, who have been chanting for Elon Musk to come to their aid.¹⁶ However, the social bonds are premised on the work and tears of the servants and on the idea of the master's exclusion from life and his lack of concern for it. The duty of the slave, the servant, and the worker is therefore to relieve the master of his burden of empathy, of feeling and acting upon that sentiment. You either have an insensitive master *or* worse—we lose reason.¹⁷

As is well known, the relationship between the master and the servant is expressed through the struggle for recognition of individual consciousness. What is usually overlooked is that the path to self-consciousness is not only paved by negation and renunciation, but also feelings of desire and fear. That the struggle for recognition is intertwined with strong feelings should not, in retrospect, seem unusual as one's own life must be put on the line. After all, one has to risk and sacrifice everything for recognition and certainty of oneself. Feelings may not reflect the spirit as such, but they are a necessary form of the internalization (*Innewerden*) of the spirit.

And it was in this spirit that Mary Magdalene was overwhelmed by her feelings. Let us not forget that she first fled “trembling and bewildered” with Salome from the scene from which Jesus's body disappeared “for they were afraid” (Mark

¹⁶ To avoid confusion, the issue is not that the Iranian protesters are wrong, as the spirit of the necessary revolution was heard in the chants of “No Mullahs, No Shah, Just Democracy” on the same day. What is at stake is that the noblest and purest people, causes, and ideas are much more susceptible to succumbing to reactionary solutions, which are always at hand, than to the servants of hope who keep people's dreams alive. This makes it all the more important to reject the symbolic gestures that inscribe in radical movements the seeds of their doom, which the outreach to Musk certainly is.

¹⁷ There are two distinct ways of abolishing the master. By addition or subtraction. The second one is based on the necessity to act and to have done away with masters based on transcendence, in the natural order or their assumed position of exception, in the name of reason and knowledge.

16:8). Despite knowing that she might encounter the walking dead son of God at any moment, her restlessness did not give her peace, but it was in this way that she found or grasped herself as other than herself. She returned to the tomb and wept when she first laid eyes on Jesus and mistook him for the gardener. This discordance between her self, who could only recognize a public worker, and herself coming to grasp with her otherness that can recognize the master is in full display. Her weeping was not out of love, gratitude, or sorrow for her Rabboni, but because she underwent the struggle for recognition and, as a servant, committed herself to the duty to the Lord, the absolute master—death. This duty is never solitary as it is always paired with the right. It is a binding relationship that enables “affirmative freedom” (Hegel 2008, p. 157) as it restricts the arbitrariness of the master’s actions, binding in the sense that they bind together in a union. The right of the master is therefore the duty of the servant.

Bibliography

- Altman, Robert and Fellowes, Julian (2001) *Gosford Park* (USA Films).
- Aumiller, Rachel (2018) “Twice Two: Hegel’s Comic Redoubling of Being and Nothing,” *Problemi International* Vol. 2 No. 2.
- Dahlstrom, Daniel (2013) “The Self before Self-Consciousness: Hegel’s Developmental Account,” *Hegel Bulletin*, 34/2, 135–158. doi:10.1017/hgl.2013.20.
- De Courville Nicol, Valérie (2011) *Social Economies of Fear and Desire: Emotional Regulation, Emotion Management, and Embodied Autonomy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Földényi, F. László (2020) *Dostoyevsky Reads Hegel in Siberia and Bursts into Tears* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1975) *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

- (2004) *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Part two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, transl. by Miller, Arnold V., with a foreword by Findlay, John N. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- (2007) *Philosophy of Mind*, ed. M. J. Inwood and trans. W. Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- (2010a) *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic*, trans. and ed. K. Blinkmann and D.O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- (2010b) *The Science of Logic*, trans. and ed. G. de Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- (2011) *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Vol. 1, trans. and ed. R. Brown and P. Hodgson (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- (2018) *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. and ed. Terry Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (2004) *Werke. Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 2,1*, ed. by Hammacher, K. and Jaeschke, W. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag).
- Joyce, James (2004) *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Dubliners* (New York: Barnes & Noble Classics).
- Kant, Immanuel (2006) *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, transl. and ed. by Louden, Robert B. with an introd. by Kuehn, Manfred (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Kojève, Alexandre (1969) *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press).
- Malcolm X (1990) *The Last Speeches* (New York: Pathfinder Press).
- Raimi, Sam and Spiegel, Scott (1987) *Evil Dead II* (Rosebud Releasing Corporation).
- Tarantino, Quentin (2012) *Django Unchained* (New York: The Weinstein Company).